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In light of the recent financial crises in the emerging markets, the coming-into-force of the financial
services agreement under the GATS has been considered a success.  While the agreement provides for
little new liberalization but rather formalizes the status quo, it was feared that governments could even
backtrack on previous commitments in the belief that more open markets could increase the degree of
susceptibility by undermining financial stability.  Strengthening the financial system’s ability to
evaluate and manage risk has therefore been identified as a precondition for more ambitious
liberalization efforts in the future (Dobson and Jacquet, 1998).  Encouragingly, in some countries banks
have begun to implement Value-at-Risk approaches as a tool to assess their balance sheet vulnerability.
As this paper argues, such an approach could also play a useful role in determining the extent of market
risk on the macroeconomic level, with potentially important implications regarding trade in financial
services, capital account convertibility, and international crisis management.
JEL: F32, O16
Key words:  Financial crises; trade liberalization; capital flows; risk management.
* Harvard Institute for International Development, formerly Deutsche Bank Research, Frankfurt.
 
                                                          
I am grateful to Mario Blejer, Peter Garber, Simon Johnson, Hana Polackova, Steve Radelet, Jeffrey Sachs, Liliana
Schumacher, and Ludger Schuknecht as well as seminar participants at the Harvard Institute for International




II. Liberalization of Trade in Financial Services under the GATS 5
III. Financial Services Trade and Capital Account Convertibility 7
IV. International Illiquidity and VaR 11
V. Developing Macroeconomic VaRs 15
VI. Conclusion 19
Appendix: The Basics of VaR 21
References 26
                                                                                                                                                                     3
I. Introduction
The financial services agreement (FSA) under the General Agreement of Trade in
Services (GATS), which became effective on March 1, 1999, is widely regarded as a
milestone for the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Providing a legal framework for cross-
border trade and market access in financial services and a mechanism for dispute settlement,
the FSA concentrates on one of the three major services sectors, where - along with
telecommunications services and information technology products - multilateral liberalization
agreements have recently been reached. The FSA covers around 95 percent of the world
market for financial services, whose volume is estimated at about 60 billion US dollars.
How much the FSA will actually achieve in terms of dismantling barriers to access
and hence fostering the development of efficient financial sectors remains to be seen,
however.  Those who had feared that the signatory states could backtrack on previous
commitments in light of the recent financial crises in Asia (1997-98), Russia (1998), and
Brazil (1999), have hailed the agreement as a major success.  Others, by contrast, have argued
that the agreement largely formalizes the status quo and merely represents a first step toward
more open and efficient financial systems.  Unless the FSA were followed up by more
courageous efforts to liberalize financial services trade, its impact would in their view remain
marginal.
There are at least three reasons why countries have been rather cautious in lowering
trade barriers in the area of financial services.  To begin with, the financial sector is often
regarded as ‘strategic’ to economic development and, according to this view, should best be
owned and controlled by domestic interests.  Moreover, although consumers stand to benefit
from liberalized markets, there may be political backlash from those who lose from sectoral
reforms.  Most importantly, however, the experience with financial deregulation and
liberalization has been rather mixed. Several countries have suffered serious banking crises
following the opening of their financial markets, and, as formal econometric work shows,
banking crises have generally been good predictors of currency crises (for an overview, see
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999).
Against this background, strengthening the financial system’s ability to evaluate and
manage market risk has been identified as a precondition for more ambitious liberalization
efforts in the future (Dobson and Jacquet, 1998).  First and foremost, this entails improving
the internal risk management of individual financial institutions, for example, on the basis of
Value-at-Risk (VaR) models, in order to assess their balance sheet vulnerability with respect4
to changes in asset prices, such as exchange rates, interest rates, or equity prices.  As a result,
the risk of international illiquidity  should be reduced.  According to Valesco and Chang
(1999), this phenomenon appears to have been the key factor behind the financial turmoil in
virtually all Asian countries, with the consolidated financial system having potential short-
term obligations in foreign currency that exceed the amount of foreign currency it can have
access to on short notice.
However, while international illiquidity of financial institutions may be sufficient to
trigger a crisis, the experience in Mexico (1994) or the ERM (1992-93), for example, suggests
that financial turmoil may also arise from other factors.  For governments to promote
financial integration by dismantling barriers to trade in financial services and introducing
capital account convertibility, it would therefore be important to enhance their risk
management also on the macro level, focusing on the country’s balance sheet vulnerability as
opposed to a regime’s sustainability.  Such a macro risk management tool has recently been
developed by Blejer and Schumacher (1998), employing the same methodology as used in
VaR models for individual financial institutions.  Their approach focuses on a country’s
central bank as a lender of last resort.  While central banks can not fail commercially as they
retain the ability to issue high-powered money at any time, they behave, as Blejer and
Schumacher argue, in a manner closely resembling a conventional commercial failure when
forsaking a commitment to a pre-announced nominal regime.  The probability of such an
outcome increases, of course, with the risk that the central bank becomes insolvent – in the
sense that its capital is exhausted.  Various factors may be responsible for this, including a
systemic banking crisis where foreign creditors stop rolling over and demand immediate
payment on existing loans to domestic banks and companies resulting in a situation of
international illiquidity.
As we discuss in this paper, Blejer’s and Schumacher’s approach should be expanded
in two important ways, namely by (i) consolidating the accounts of the central bank and the
treasury and (ii) taking into account off-balance sheet items.  Thus amended, the VaR
approach should help governments pay greater attention to alleviate excessive risk exposure
on the macro level, which could have important policy implications.  As some believe (e.g.,
Dornbusch, 1998), countries employing macro VaRs may live perfectly well with an open
capital market and highly mobile capital; as a result, they may show a greater willingness to
dismantle barriers to financial services trade, which in turn should help foster financial
intermediation and economic growth.  To the extent that VaR approaches became mandatory,
they could help reduce the problem of moral hazard inherently associated with IMF lending:5
any country that is found deficient would not qualify for IMF support, while honest crises
would be generously solved with IMF credits.
In discussing the potential role of VaR models on the macro level, the rest of the
paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the general principles of GATS and assesses
the importance of the recent FSA. Section 3 examines the relationship between financial
services trade and capital flows.  Section 4 focuses on the role of micro VaRs in reducing the
risk of international illiquidity.  Section 5 discusses how this methodology can be applied on
the macro level.  Section 6, finally, concludes.
II. Liberalization of Trade in Financial Services under the GATS
Rather than representing a liberalization agreement itself, the GATS provides only a
framework for liberalization of trade in services.
1 In so doing, it is based on three pillars.
First of all, it includes a framework agreement, which contains general provisions covering all
sectors (i.e. financial services, telecommunications, and information technology). Second,
special sector annexes and other agreements, such as the Understanding on Financial
Services, contain provisions focusing specifically on the sector concerned. The third pillar,
finally, consists of scheduled commitments on market access, national treatment and other
commitments.  As regards the last point, the GATS defines trade in financial services, like in
other services, in terms of four modes of supply:
2
(1)  Cross-border supply, not requiring the physical movement of consumers or
suppliers (e.g., consumers or financial institutions in one country are permitted to
take a loan or purchase securities from a foreign bank).
(2)  Consumption abroad, whereby consumers are allowed to purchase financial
services while travelling abroad (e.g., a resident in one country crosses the border
and opens a bank account in a foreign country).
(3)  Commercial presence, or permanent establishment of service-providing entities
in the territory of the consumer (e.g., a country allows the establishment of
foreign banks in its territory).
                                                          
1 A detailed discussion on the history of the GATS and the structure of its provisions can be found in
Dobson and Jacquet (1998) and Kono et al. (1997).
2 Note that the exact definition of the transactions limits the scope of the agreement. For example,
while Mode 2 requires the authorities of country A to permit its residents to open a bank account in
country B, the GATS does not require the authorities of country B to allow foreigners to make deposits
in its banks.6
(4)  Movement of natural persons who supply financial services in the territory of a
foreign country (e.g. a bank opens a subsidiary abroad and is allowed to send
personnel to that country).
While the FSA goes far beyond previous regional trade agreements (e.g., EU and
NAFTA), in terms of actually dismantling trade barriers in the area of financial services, it
has done little more than formalizing the status quo.  True, the FSA has enabled most of the
main players to bind existing practices in an international agreement.  However, the
agreement entails little new liberalization.  Indeed, the main emerging markets (EM)
countries, with few exceptions, have offered little new access to their banking sectors, which
often dominate their financial industries, although some of them have taken a more liberal
approach towards their insurance sectors.
The GATS rules are based on the same general principles as trade in goods, i.e.,
most-favored-nation treatment (MFN) (Article II) and transparency (Article III).  There are
important limitations, however, which render them weaker than those of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  For example, national treatment is not an
automatic but negotiable right.  Exemptions to the MFN obligation in specific sectors are
permitted, provided that the measures are listed in the list of MFN exemptions and that such
exemptions, in principle, should not extend beyond 10 years.  Specific obligations regarding
market access and national treatment (Articles XVI and XVII, respectively) are based on a
positive list or bottom-up approach, that is, they apply only to services that are inscribed in
the Schedules of Commitments of countries where specific commitments are listed in the
form of limitations or measures applicable.  Such limitations are listed for each of the four
modes of supply and may be either cross-sectional or sector-specific.  Clearly, this approach
is less liberal than the negative-list or top-down approach employed in NAFTA and OECD
agreements where all sectors are covered unless specifically excluded.  This also applies to
financial innovations, where the GATS allows countries to impose discriminatory restrictions
on their supply.
Furthermore, the Annex on Financial Services recognizes that countries may take
measures for prudential reasons, including for the protection of investors, depositors, and for
preserving the integrity and stability of the financial system.  While such measures shall not
be used as a means to circumvent a country’s commitments or obligations under the GATS,
they do not need to be inscribed in the Schedules of Specific Commitments, whether or not
they are in conformity with any other provisions of the agreement.  However, there is no
definition of prudential rules, and as Sorsa (1997) argues, the broad prudential carve-out in7
the GATS can imply very broad departures from the basic principles of the agreement.
Potentially, the measures can permit discrimination among countries, for example, on the
basis of capital adequacy ratios or discretion in approving banking licenses, which can go
against the MFN principle or national treatment.
However, even in the absence of such measures, the GATS may not be sufficient to
ensure foreign suppliers’ market access.  While Article XVII requires that foreign suppliers
must receive treatment ‘no less favorable’ than national suppliers, in some cases better-than-
national treatment may actually be necessary for foreign institutions to be able to compete.
For instance, a regulator in a member country, which prohibits universal banking, could
preclude branches of a bank from a member state that allows universal banking (Woolcock,
1997, p. 8).  While during the negotiations general agreement emerged that each country must
have the right to regulate its financial industry in order to ensure stability, there will thus
always be a potential that these policies form barriers to market access.  Removing all
potential barriers to market access therefore requires harmonizing regulatory policies, for
which the GATS, however, does not provide an adequate framework.
Finally, recognizing that financial instability and external imbalances may be closely
intertwined, the GATS also allows members to introduce temporary restrictions in the event
of serious balance of payments problems - subject to consultations with WTO members
(Article XII).  However, as Sorsa (1997) argues the role of the WTO Committee on Balance
of Payments Restrictions appears vague, given that the IMF independently approves
restrictions on current account payments that fall under its jurisdiction.  As a matter of fact, if
a particular restriction on payments and transfers is approved by the IMF, the BOP
Committee’s role may be limited to improving what the Fund has already done under its
mandate.
III.  Financial Services Trade and Capital Account Convertibility
Capital account restrictions are also subject to approval by the WTO BOP
Committee, but only to the extent that they affect international transfers and payments for
transactions relating to specific commitments under the agreement.  For example, a country
which has committed itself to providing market access to foreign banks under Mode 3
(commercial presence) would be required to allow capital inflows in conjunction with the
initial share capital of a foreign institution. For Mode 2 transactions, not even this obligation
exists.  Rather, under Mode 2 countries seem to be free to set restrictions on capital transfers
related to services supplied under the market access commitments made.  As Kono et al.
(1997, p. 23) emphasize, “(t)he GATS focuses upon seeking improvements in the terms and8
conditions of market access and non-discriminatory treatment for foreign suppliers of
financial services, and not on the question of how far and how fast a government liberalizes
capital account restrictions.”
While it is important to recognize that financial services liberalization does not
necessarily imply capital account liberalization, it appears that the relationship between trade
in financial services and capital flows is particularly close under Mode 1 (cross-border
supply).  To the extent that governments are committed to allowing foreign banks to provide
loans to domestic residents involving international capital, the movement of capital related to
the underlying transaction should be free of restrictions. 
3  As a result, liberalization of
financial services trade under this mode is likely to result in a significant increase in capital
flows, with a strong bias towards short-term lending (Table 1).
Table 1: Effects of Financial Services Commitments on Capital Flows and the Financial System,
As Affected by the Mode of Supply and the Range of Instruments
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
      By Mode of supply   By range of instruments
   which can be supplied




    information weak strong weak strong
Incentive to improve
    regulation/supervision weak strong weak strong
Infrastructure/
    market development weak strong weak strong
Risk management weak strong weak strong
Capital flows
More capital flows yes limited
 b) b)
Bias toward  possibly
    short-term lending strong weak strong weak
Increased possibly
    volatility strong weak strong weak
Efficiency/local benefits
More competition/
    efficiency strong strong weak strong
Skills/technology
    transfer weak strong weak strong
Local employment
    creation weak strong weak strong
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Kono and Schuknecht (1998)
a)  Commitments exclude or limit provision of important instruments/allow only lending and deposit-taking.
b)  Depends on the instrument and mode of supply perimitted, and market conditions.
                                                          
3 This case needs to be clearly distinguished from the case where a domestic bank provides a loan to
domestic residents involving foreign capital.  Such a transaction would entail international capital flows
but not trade in financial services. For a more detailed discussion on the links between financial
services liberalization and capital account liberalization, see Kono and Schuknecht (1998).9
Imposing restrictions on transactions that fall under this mode would be subject to
approval, which gives the WTO BOP Committee a potentially important role.  Suppose, for
instance, a Mode 1 country experienced large capital inflows and imposed restrictions in
response to mounting concerns about the exchange rate and sudden reversals of flows.  In
practice, however, the potential role of the Committee seems rather limited, given that at
present relatively few countries have made commitments under Mode 1, reflecting fears that a
more liberal trade policy could seriously undermine financial stability.
In light of the severe financial turmoil over the last few years, the question arises
whether some countries would not have been better advised to pursue a more cautious
approach to capital account convertibility and financial services trade.  Rather than
dismantling barriers to trade in financial services across-the-board, it might have been
preferable for them to maintain at least restrictions under mode 1.  This applies primarily to
countries with weak financial systems.  For these countries, Kono and Schuknecht (1998, p.
29), in a recent WTO working paper, caution against modal neutrality, i.e., equal
liberalization commitments between, for example, cross-border supply and supply through
commercial presence.  While in their view,  “…countries with stable financial systems and a
sound macroeconomic and regulatory framework have every reason to apply a very broad
liberalisation strategy and commit to far-reaching trade liberalisation across all modes of
supply,” they recognize that in countries with weak financial systems potentially volatile
capital flows can be highly destabilizing, resulting in banking and currency crises.  Thus, with
respect to these countries they counsel to confine commitments to the commercial presence of
foreign institutions, requiring only limited liberalization of capital flows in the GATS context.
Kono’s and Schuknecht’s conclusions are based on a rating system that tries to
quantify the modal bias in a number of EM countries involved in the recent financial turmoil.
This rating system ranges from –2 to 2 (Table 2).  As a matter of fact, most EM countries are
unbound in terms of Mode 1 commitments, that is, they have made no commitments for
cross-border supply (=0).  There are two notable exceptions, however, namely Indonesia and
Malaysia. Indeed, Indonesia has virtually no restrictions on cross-border trade, and because of
the potential bias towards short-term volatile capital flows this policy brings about, the
authors grade this country as 2 in this category.  Under mode 3 liberalization, which is
assumed to bring about stabilizing effects for the domestic financial system, Indonesia is
given a –1 (partial liberalization), resulting in a modal bias of 1.  By contrast, Argentina has
made virtually no commitments in terms of cross-border supply ( = 0), whereas it pursues a
very liberal policy with respect to the commercial presence of foreign institutions, promoting
balanced and stable capital flows and stable financial systems (-2).  Argentina’s total score is10
thus –2, the lowest possible result.  Note that none of the countries earned the highest and
least stability-enhancing score of “2” in the Kono-Schuknecht study, as none has committed
to fully liberal trade under mode 1 while making no commitments under mode 3.   Indeed,
most EM countries show a negative modal bias - as advocated by Kono and Schuknecht, with
Malaysia being the only country in the sample with modal neutrality.
Table 2: Assessment of Financial Services Commitments in the GATS,
Selected Emerging Markets
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Level of  Indicator Indicator
                         Commitments 
a) of modal of lending
   bias 
b)     bias 
c)
Mode 1    Mode 3
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Asia
  Hong Kong   0       -1          -1           0
  Indonesia    2         -1           1           2
   Korea     0       -1          -1           4
   Malaysia    1       -1           0           0
   Philippines     0       -1          -1              0
   Thailand    0       -1          -1           2
Latin America
   Argentina     0        -2           -2           0
   Brazil     0        -1           -1           0
   Chile     0        -1           -1           0
   Mexico     0        -1           -1           2
   Venezuela    0        -1           -1           2
Eastern Europe
   Czech Rep.    0        -1            -1           0
   Hungary     0        -1            -1           0
   Poland     0        -1            -1           4
   Slovak Rep.      0        -1            -1           0
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Kono and Schuknecht (1998)
a)  0 = unbound; 1/-1 = commitments to partial liberalization, 2/-2 = commitment to full liberalization.
b)  Difference between first and second columns, ranging from –2 to 2.
c)  0 means equal commitments for lending and securities or more liberal commitments for securities; 2 and 4 mean
weak/strong bias in favor of lending liberalization.
While the majority of countries considered here are neutral with respect to their
commitments for lending and securities, some countries do show at least a weak bias in favor
of lending liberalization (last column in table 2).  This group includes, for example, Indonesia,
a country that already appeared relatively susceptible due to its modal bias.  The same degree
of lending bias is given to Thailand, Mexico, and Venezuela, whereas an even stronger bias is
found in the cases of Korea and Poland.  Taken together, six countries show a positive
indicator as the sum of the two sub-indices (i.e., Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, Mexico,
Venezuela, and Poland).  While this indicator should not be interpreted as an early warning
indicator for financial crises as it ignores such important variables as macroeconomic and
regulatory policies, it would seem to provide a useful instrument to help assess the risk of
erratic capital flows.11
IV.  International Illiquidity and VaR
Sudden reversals of short-term capital flows have played a key role in all the recent
EM crises.  According to the International Monetary Fund (1999), net capital flows to the five
crisis countries in Asia (i.e. Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) totaled
more than 60 billion US dollars in 1996, more than twice as much as in 1992 (Table 3).  More
than one-third was attributed to commercial bank lending.  In 1997-98, however, the five
countries suffered from huge capital outflows of almost 70 billion US dollars, with
commercial bank lending having proved to be particularly volatile.  As a matter of fact,
foreign banks reduced their net exposure to this group of countries by almost 90 billion US
dollars during this period.
Table 3.  Net Private Capital Flows to Selected Emerging Markets, 1992-98
(in billions of USD)
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
Asia
   Total 17.9 57.3 66.4 95.1 100.5    3.2 -55.1
     Foreign direct investment     14.8 33.0 45.3 49.8   55.1  62.2  50.0
     Portfolio investment   7.8 21.0   9.4 10.9   12.6    0.9 -15.4
     Bank loans & other  -4.7   3.3 11.7 34.4   32.8 -60.3 -89.7
Five affected Asian Countries 
a)
    Total 26.6 31.9 33.2 62.5 62.4 -19.7 -46.2
      Foreign direct investment      6.3   6.7   6.5   8.7   9.5   12.1    4.9
      Portfolio investment   5.3 16.5   8.3 17.0 20.0   12.6   -6.5
      Bank loans & other 15.0   8.7 18.4 36.9 32.9 -44.5 -44.5
Brazil
    Total 14.1 12.0  10.0 33.1 35.2 20.5  17.1
      Foreign direct investment      1.9   0.8    2.0   2.8 10.0 15.5  25.0
      Portfolio investment 14.5 12.3  51.1 11.7 21.4 10.5  17.5
      Bank loans & other    -2.3  -1.2 -43.2 18.6   3.8  -5.5 -25.4
Russia
    Total 0.7 5.9    2.1 15.1  -2.6    1.0  14.7
    Foreign direct investment 0.7 0.9    0.5   1.7    1.7    3.6    1.2
    Portfolio investment 0.0 5.0  16.5 14.4  21.9  17.2    4.5
    Bank loans & other 0.0 0.0 -14.9  -1.1 -26.3 -19.8 -20.4
Memorandum items:
   Total net private capital flows
   as percent of recipient
   countries’ GDP
     Asia 0.9 2.5 2.7 3.3  3.1  0.1   -1.8
     Five affected Asian countries 
a) 4.0 4.4 4.0 6.3  5.8 -2.0   -7.1
     Brazil 3.6 2.7 1.8 4.7  4.5  2.6    2.2
     Russia  0.8 3.2 0.8 4.3 -0.6  0.2   -5.2
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
a)  Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.
Source: International Monetary Fund (1999), pp.52-53.12
While little progress seems to have been made in identifying those factors - among
the many weaknesses exhibited by the afflicted countries - that are necessary for a crisis to
occur,
4 more recently, a new promising strand of literature has emerged, which has identified
international illiquidity as a single factor sufficient to trigger a crisis. In these models,
international  illiquidity is perceived as a situation in which a country’s consolidated financial
system has potential short-term obligations in foreign currency that exceed the amount of
foreign currency it can have access to on short notice.  As Chang and Velasco (1999) argue,
international illiquidity is what the very diverse recent crises in emerging markets have had in
common: a sudden loss of confidence, prompting creditors to stop to roll over and demand
immediate payment on existing loans, resulting in sharply rising ratios of hard currency short-
term liabilities to liquid assets, asset price collapses and widespread bankruptcies.
A detailed analysis of the dynamics of creditor panics in Asia is provided by Radelet
and Sachs (1998 a and b) who emphasize the role of credit to the private sector.  Much of the
rapid expansion of credit was financed by offshore borrowing by the banking sector, and to
make things worse, a significant share of the credit was funneled into speculative investments
in the real estate markets, rather than into increasing productive capacity for manufactured
output.  Thus, borrowers who were not earning foreign exchange faced growing dangers of
insolvency in the event of a marked depreciation, while the maturity transformation (i.e.,
borrowing offshore in short-term maturities and lending onshore with long maturities)
exposed the financial sector to heightened risks of massive bank runs.
Why have banks shown such a strong bias towards short-term borrowing, if short-
term debt increases the risk of becoming illiquid?  In explaining this phenomenon, Chang and
Valesco (1999) point to a number of market failures.  To the extent that excessive short-term
borrowing is indeed the result of the banks’ failure to internalize the social effects of reducing
their liquidity, government intervention to discourage short-term borrowing would appear to
be justified.
5  A natural candidate for a policy, which aims at lengthening the maturity of debt,
is a tax on short-term capital inflows, such as the one imposed by the Chilean authorities.
Clearly, such a policy would also have serious implications for the liberalization of financial
services trade under mode 1, which, as discussed above, tends to be associated with a
significant bias in favor of short-term flows.  As Dobson and Jacquet (1998, p. 34) argue,
                                                          
4 As Berg and Patillo (1999) have recently shown, existing models of early-warning indicators and
speculative attacks have generally failed to predict the recent EM crises out of sample.
5 As Chang and Valesco (1999) argue, this conclusion is subject to two important caveats, however.
First of all, short-term debt serves some useful functions, for example, as a commitment device.
Second, foreigners are not the only short-term creditors.  Hence, abolishing short-term debt is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for ruling out crises.13
however, “capital controls (…) substantially reduce users’ freedom to buy financial services
directly from foreign financial institutions and may also discourage entry…”
Another reason why there has been “too much” short-term foreign borrowing may
simply be sought in the lack of adequate risk management, however.  Thus, possible market
failures notwithstanding, it would appear imperative to improve the banks’ capability to
assess their balance sheet vulnerability as a precondition for opening the capital account and
liberalizing the cross-border supply of financial services.  Encouragingly, in a number of EM
countries important steps have already been taken in this regard, and in some of them banks
are now required to employ so-called value-at-risk techniques in order to assess and manage
their exposure to adverse changes in asset prices.  In the industrial countries, these techniques
have already become standard, not only with respect to the banks’ internal risk management
but also for banking supervision.
6 According to the new set of rules, commercial banks may
choose between the standardized (8 percent) approach and the internal model approach, with
the ultimate goal being the sole use of the latter.
While the basic idea of this approach stems from standard portfolio theory, VaR
models are relatively new.  Their development has largely been motivated by the growing use
of derivatives and the fact that the largest financial losses were mainly the result of the poor
monitoring of market risk. These cases include, for example, Barings Inc, which collapsed in
1995 as a result of a USD 1.3 bn loss triggered by one of its trader’s speculation in the
Japanese stock market. Another high profile case was Germany’s Metallgesellschaft which
lost a substantial sum in the oil futures market.  Other examples are Daiwa, Orange County,
Kashima Oil, and Showa Shell Sekiyu (Jorion, 1997, pp. 24-46).  Without going into too
much technical detail here, it appears useful to outline the fundamental structure of these
models, with a view to applying later a VaR approach to the macroeconomic level (on the
technical basics see appendix).
Broadly speaking, VaR approaches aim at assessing the vulnerability of a particular
portfolio by calculating the maximum potential loss over a certain target horizon (typically 24
hours) within a given confidence interval.
7  In its simplest form, the VaR approach assumes
that all asset-price changes can be modeled as conditionally normally distributed. In order to
                                                          
6  While until recently banking supervision in the G-10 countries was determined on the basis of the
1988 Basle Accord, which required banks to hold a minimum amount of capital of 8 percent as a safety
cushion against bankruptcy, from the beginning of 1998 commercial banks have been permitted to
determine their regulatory capital requirements for financial risk exposure using VaR models.  On the
1996 Market Risk Amendment by the Basle Committee of Banking Supervision, see Chorafas (1998).14
illustrate the basic idea of the VaR methodology, consider the following simple example
where a portfolio consists of only one asset.  Suppose a Thai bank, benefiting from mode 1
liberalization of financial services trade, has borrowed USD 1 mn from a US bank and is
hence exposed to changes in the THB/USD exchange rate.  Suppose further that under
specific assumptions about the probability distribution the worst movement of the exchange
rate in the next 24 hours, at the 99 percent confidence interval, is a 15 percent depreciation of
the THB.  If the current exchange rate is THB/USD = 35, the VaR of holding the USD
position is THB 5,125 mn. This means that according to the VaR there is only 1 chance in
100 that a loss greater than THB 5,125 mn would occur in the next 24 hours.
Of course, in reality portfolios typically consist of many assets which are exposed to
different risks of adverse price movements.  However, under the assumption of normality the
portfolio return is given by a linear combination of Gaussian variables and is also
characterized by a normal distribution.  Thus, the mean vector and the variance-covariance
matrix of contemporaneous price changes together suffice for calculating the worst loss
within a given confidence interval.  This simple approach is known as the delta-normal or
standard variance-covariance VaR model.  On the basis of this standard approach, more
sophisticated models have been developed, taking into account that the distribution of asset
price changes for many securities usually has thicker tails than predicted by a normal
distribution (i.e., extreme movements seem to occur much more frequently than is the case
under a Gaussian assumption) and that complex derivatives possess non-linear payoff
structures.
8
Reflecting these developments, a large number of financial institutions have begun to
employ nonparametric VaR approaches, for which relatively few assumptions are made about
the underlying distribution.  In this context, many banks have implemented Monte-Carlo
methods, which entail the creation of complete numerical simulations of a whole group of
financial variables.  More recently, it has also become increasingly popular to subject VaR
calculations to stress testing, an approach, which involves calculating outcomes under
‘extreme scenarios’.  By violating some key assumptions, this procedure aims to assess the
                                                                                                                                                                     
7 Good introductions to the VaR approach are provided, for example, in Best (1998), Dowd (1998), and
Jorion (1997).
8 For example, while a 99-percent confidence interval is given by 2.33 standard deviations under a
normal distribution, the recent shocks in the emerging markets were equivalent to about 6-7 standard
deviations.  The experience with these shocks has triggered various new approaches.  While, for
example, so-called CondVaRs estimate the probability-weighted average of the tail (and hence includes
all values of the tail), HeadVaRs refer to the highest point in the tail (implying that the tail needs to go
out far enough that one can be sure it is the highest value.  Yet others have begun to experiment with
Extreme Value Theory in order to derive a functional tail form on the basis of a limited amount of data.
For a discussion on these developments, see James (1999).15
impact on the VaR methodology’s performance of the breakdown of assumed relationships
pertaining to relative prices, correlations, volatilities, and other essential summary quantities.
The analysis of low-probability adverse events may also be used to examine causal
relationships among core market factors, co-movements in market and credit risk, and other
fundamental patterns, all of which can become excessively strained during the period of
dislocation coinciding with a state of financial crisis (Crouhy, Galai, and Mark, 1998, p. 16).
V. Developing Macroeconomic VaRs
While the wider use of VaR models in EM economies could be an important step
towards greater stability in the banking sector as a precondition for opening the capital
account and liberalizing trade in financial services, it will not always be sufficient to prevent
financial crises.  As the experience in Asia suggests, international illiquidity of the banking
sector can be assumed to be sufficient for a crisis to occur, but there may be also other
reasons.  In the case of Mexico, for example, we know that it was the government’s inability
to roll over its large stock of short-term debt (in particular, the Tesobonos) that was the key
factor in triggering the currency crisis in December 1994 (Garber, 1999).  Similarly, the
recent currency crisis in Brazil has largely been the result of an unsustainable fiscal position.
Finally, the ERM crisis in 1992/93 had little to do with international illiquidity caused by
imprudent business practices of UK commercial banks.
However, once a crisis occurs, it causes almost always serious repercussions for the
banking sector.  Even in countries where banks appear comparatively robust, can currency
crises seriously undermine financial stability, which, in turn, may aggravate the authorities’
efforts to stabilize the macroeconomy.  This seems all the more likely the more open the
capital account is, helping to explain why some countries that are fairly advanced with respect
to risk management on the micro level and banking supervision (notably Argentina) have
been rather cautious in dismantling barriers to trade in financial services according to mode 1.
Thus, for a country to reap the benefits of greater access to foreign savings while limiting the
potentially destabilizing effects of international capital flows it appears essential to implement
an all-encompassing risk approach, assessing the vulnerability of the overall balance sheet of
the economy.
A basic approach, which should help draw the authorities’ attention to alleviating
excessive risk at an early stage, has recently been suggested by Blejer and Schumacher (1998)
who concentrate on the balance sheet of a country’s central bank as a lender of last resort (see
appendix).  As a matter of course, central banks cannot commercially fail as they retain the
ability to issue high-powered money at any time.  While they therefore cannot become16
illiquid, they may, however, become insolvent in the sense that their capital gets exhausted.
Should the markets believe that the central bank might indeed become insolvent, there would
likely be a run on the country’s foreign exchange reserves, possibly resulting in international
illiquidity.
Indeed, as Blejer and Schumacher (1998) argue central banks behave in a manner
closely resembling a conventional commercial failure when forsaking a commitment to a pre-
announced nominal regime.  This analogy seems particularly obvious in the case of a fixed
exchange rate regime but may additionally be applied to other types of nominal regimes.
Since a default in central bank commitments represents the predictable outcome of a loss of
central bank solvency, a VaR analysis pointing to increasing vulnerability in the central
bank’s position could serve as a useful indicator for the probability of a devaluation or other
major adjustments necessary to fulfill a nominal commitment.  If such an outcome were to be
avoided, the stance of financial policies would need to be changed in anticipation of an
impending deterioration.
One important risk facing the central bank obviously stems from a systemic failure of
the banking system.  In the case of a banking crisis, financial institutions might not be able to
service their liabilities, and as a lender of last resort the central bank must be prepared to
inject huge amounts of liquidity to assist banks suffering from large withdrawals of deposits
in order to ensure financial stability.  VaRs calculated by individual banks should help reduce
this risk, as explained above.  However, for a central bank monitoring and managing its risk
of becoming insolvent, it would be important to estimate the value of its contingent liability
resulting from its lender of last resort function, whether there is an explicit or implicit deposit
insurance scheme in place.
As Blejer and Schumacher (1998) emphasize, a deposit insurance scheme may be
perceived as a put option sold by the central bank to the financial sector, whereby the value of
the option depends on the commercial banks’ leverage, the volatility of banks’ assets, and the
interest rate.  In this analogy, banks hold the right to exercise the option when the value of
their assets (the “underlying” asset of the put) falls below the value of the debt (the exercise
price), that is, they fail.  In exercising the option, the banks sell their assets to the central bank
and get paid an amount equivalent to their debt that they use to pay their creditors.  The more
leveraged the banks are and the more risk they undertake, the more valuable the put option is.
The value of the option rises with the level of interest rates, since bank assets usually have a
longer duration than their liabilities.  An increase in the interest rate thus reduces the market
value of the banks’ capital and makes the exercise of the put option with the central bank17
more likely.  Similarly, the degree of currency transformation affects the value of the option.
Permitting greater access to financial services supplied by foreign institutions and opening up
the capital account could thus have an important impact on the central bank’s balance sheet.
The greater the value of the put option, the larger the liability of the central bank, and in
determining this value, VaRs may play an important role.
However, central banks face not only risks stemming from their function as lenders of
last resort, but they are also exposed to risks of movements in market prices.  Foreign
exchange reserves, for example, are typically held in other countries’ government securities
(most commonly triple-A rated and highly liquid US Treasuries) and are hence subject to the
risk of price changes in the bond markets.  In most countries, central banks’ portfolios are
diversified across various currencies and, as a result, subject to changes in the cross rates in
the FX markets.  As far as domestic assets are concerned, credit to the banking system may be
perceived as a long position of the central bank, whereby a decline in the domestic interest
rate increases the discounted value of the outstanding stock of loans.  In many countries, the
central bank also holds government securities, which are subject to price fluctuations.  On the
liabilities side, by contrast, the monetary base represents a “short” position of the central
bank.  The same applies to foreign liabilities, where the counterparty usually receives a fixed
coupon, with the central bank also bearing the risk of devaluation.
For a VaR analysis to serve its intended function properly, it is imperative that not
only on-balance sheet operations but also all off-balance sheet transactions, such as forwards
and foreign exchange swaps, be properly accounted for.  Indeed, such transactions are
commonplace among central banks in emerging markets.  Usually, they are designed to
provide hedges to operators when financial markets are incomplete.  However, they have also
been used (e.g., in Thailand) to strengthen the credibility of exchange-rate pegs, whereby they
have normally been kept as off-balance sheet operations.
Blejer’s and Schumacher’s approach can be relatively easily expanded in two
significant ways (for details, see appendix).  First of all, it would appear important to
consolidate the central bank’s and the relevant treasury accounts.  In their original model,
Blejer and Schumacher assume that the central bank holds the entire stock of government
foreign assets and foreign debt, denominated in foreign currency.  Moreover, the government
is not expected to repay its debt to the central bank.  These assumptions can be easily relaxed,
however, enabling the VaR approach to deal with the risk implications of direct lending to
government and foreign borrowing by the treasury.  Amalgamating the different accounts
would also appear important given that debt issued by the treasury in domestic currency is18
often held by foreigners which could represent a significant contingent liability regarding the
country’s foreign exchange reserves.  Furthermore, the VaR approach would need to take into
account that the government may hold sizable foreign exchange reserves of its own.
Integrating the central bank’s and the treasury accounts, is not enough, however.
While conventional fiscal analysis tends to concentrate on governments’ direct explicit
liabilities (e.g., foreign and domestic sovereign borrowing and budgetary expenditures), the
fiscal authorities – like the central bank - may also face important off-balance sheet liabilities.
Second, therefore, one would need to take into account that such implicit liabilities may affect
the true extent of market risk the country is exposed to.  These liabilities may arise from a
moral obligation of the government that reflects public and interest-group pressures.  To the
extent that these liabilities represent an obligation of the government regardless of a particular
event, they may be labeled as direct implicit liabilities (Polackova, 1999).  Typically, such
liabilities affect the longer-term sustainability of the public finances, and ignoring them could
result in a serious underestimation of the budget deficit and an overestimation of the true
extent of fiscal adjustment.  As Blejer and Cheasty (1993) and Buiter (1983, 1985) argue, the
(change in the) net worth of the government would therefore appear to be a superior measure
from a conceptual point of view.
However, there may also be important contingent liabilities, which may result in an
obligation of the government if a particular event occurs.  Such an event may be triggered, for
example, by adverse developments of asset prices.  Contingent liabilities may also represent a
non-trivial fiscal risk and can take the form of explicit or implicit obligations (Polackova,
1999).  As regards the former, typical examples include state guarantees for non-sovereign
borrowing and obligations issued to sub-national governments and public and private sector
entities (e.g. development banks); umbrella state guarantees, for example, for small business
loans; trade and exchange rate guarantees issued by the state; or state guarantees on private
investments.  However, even in the absence of explicit guarantees, the government may feel
obliged to step in, for example, in the case of defaults of sub-national government or public or
private entities; the cleanup of liabilities of entities being privatized; the failure of a non-
guaranteed pension fund or employment fund; or bailouts following a reversal in private
capital flows.  While these liabilities are not officially recognized until after a failure occurs,
they may seriously increase the vulnerability of the country.
Such a formalized, all-encompassing approach would have the important advantage
of revealing in a consistent way a country’s vulnerability to market risk and policies to reduce
it.  Clearly, the analysis should be subjected to stress tests, just in the same way as VaR19
approaches for individual financial institutions as we discussed in the preceding section.  This
would appear all the more important in countries where the authorities choose to dismantle
barriers to trade in financial services and open up their capital accounts, exposing the
economy to the vicissitudes of volatile capital flows.  While it would of course be naïve to
assume that the approach suggested in this paper could eliminate the risk of a crisis, arguably
a rigorous shift in attention from analyzing the sustainability of regime towards assessing its
vulnerability could at least have limited the recent turmoil in the emerging markets.  In our
view, the VaR approach could thus have important implications not only for those countries
that actually implement it but also for the global economy.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper, we have discussed an approach, which could be employed to assess the
market risk exposure of countries as opposed to the balance sheet vulnerability of individual
financial institutions.  By focusing on the worst possible outcome, or the value-at-risk, this
approach aims at shifting the emphasis away from examining the sustainability of a regime
towards analyzing the risk of its failure.  In so doing, the VaR approach proposed here is
compatible with the various generations of models of balance of payments crises and
speculative attacks, which have been developed over the last two decades or so, namely (i) the
first-generation, or canonical, models (Krugman, 1979), which focused on the importance of
inconsistent policies; (ii) the second-generation models (e.g., Obstfeld, 1997) that were
designed under the assumption of optimizing policy makers; and, finally (iii) the third-
generation models, which have focused on factors such as corruption, imperfect democracy,
and cronyism.
Admittedly, the practical implementation of such a comprehensive macro VaR
approach may pose important challenges, especially in countries where the degree of
technical expertise is rather limited.  Another important risk may result from the quantitative
accuracy the models pretend to have, and in the hands of those who do not know what they
are doing, even the best VaR system can lead to serious problems.  Indeed, as the recent
experience with VaRs on the level of individual financial institutions suggests, this risk
should not be under-estimated.  Thus, rather than focusing exclusively on the result itself, it
appears even more important to understand the process of getting to the final number.  In this
sense, the VaR approach would force the authorities to pay greater attention to alleviate
excessive risk, helping them prevent financial crises and, if financial turmoil does occur,
identify the necessary measures to solve the crisis in the most efficient way.  As a result,
governments might show a greater willingness to open up their capital accounts, thus20
benefiting from better access to foreign savings, higher efficiency in the financial sector and
improved growth prospects, while managing the risk international financial integration may
bring about.  Therefore, the use of VaR models could in our view represent an important step
towards a more open trading system regarding financial services, which could result in greater
financial stability in the world economy and help resources allocate more efficiently on a
global basis.
As Dornbusch (1998) argues, macro VaRs could serve an important purpose in terms
of international crisis management, namely to tell “honest” crises from “dishonest” ones.  In
his view, VaRs should become mandatory for a country to have access to IMF resources.
Any country that has not implemented such an approach or failed to react to the signals
provided by the model, would not qualify for Fund support.  Honest crises, by contrast, would
be generously solved with IMF credits (and support from other multilateral and bilateral
creditors).  In this context, VaRs could play a particularly important role in determining a
country’s access to the Fund’s Supplemental Reserve Facility and the Contingent Credit
Lines. According to the IMF’s guidelines, financing can be provided where a member country
faces “exceptional payments difficulties due to a large short-term financing need,” as a result
of “…circumstances that are largely beyond the control of the member and that  stem
primarily from adverse developments in international capital markets consequent upon
developments in other countries.”  Thus, the VaR approach could represent an important
pillar in the new international financial architecture.21
Appendix: The Basics of VaR
The Variance-Covariance Approach
a
Suppose all risks are normal and the portfolio is a linear function of these normal risks. The
VaR, or the maximum expected loss over a given horizon period at a given level of
confidence, thus is a multiple of the portfolio standard deviation, and the portfolio standard
deviation is a linear function of individual volatilities and covariances.
Consider first the case of a portfolio that consists of two assets, 1 and 2, with a relevant
amount, w1, held in asset 1, and the relative amount, w2, held in asset 2 (w1 + w2 = 1).  If asset
i has a return with variance si
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 where r1,2 denotes the correlation coefficient between the returns to the two assets.  The VaR
of the portfolio is thus given by











VaR1 is the undiversified value-at-risk associated with asset 1 (i.e., -aw1s1W, with a
reflecting the level of confidence on which the VaR is predicated), while VaR2 is the
undiversified value-at-risk associated with asset 2 (i.e., -aw2s2W). (A3) defines the VaR of
the portfolio in terms of the individual variances, portfolio weights and the correlation
coefficients as the underlying portfolio factors and in terms of the undiversified VaRs of the
component assets.
If assets returns are perfectly correlated, i.e., r1,2 = 1, the portfolio VaR is simply the sum of
the individual undiversified VaRs and there is no diversification of risk. By contrast, if returns
are perfectly negatively correlated, i.e., r1,2 = -1 the two individual VaRs offset each other in
their impact on the aggregate VaR. If they are also of the same size, the portfolio VaR is zero.
                                                          
a This section follows Dowd (1998). Other good descriptions can be found in the sources referred to in
the main text.22





In the general case of n assets, the VaR of the portfolio, VaRp, can be calculated as follows:










where w represents the 1 x n weight vector [w1,w2,…,wn], s the n x n diagonal standard
deviation matrix, C the n x n correlation matrix, w
T the transpose of 
w, VaR the n x 1 vector
of individual VaRs [VaR1, VaR2,…VaRn], and VaR
T its transpose.  Thus, if all returns are
perfectly correlated, the C matrix becomes a matrix of ones. If the returns are less than
perfectly correlated, the portfolio VaR is less than the sum of the undiversified VaRs,
implying benefits from portfolio diversification.
 Consider now the case where returns are non-linear functions of risk variables, as is often the
case with derivatives and bonds, or when the risk variables themselves are non-normal.
Provided that the degree of non-linearity is sufficiently limited, a common method is the
delta-normal approach, or first-order approximation.
b  For illustrative purposes, consider an
equity call option, whose value c depends on the price of the underlying stock, the exercise
price of the option, and the volatility of the underlying stock price. Focusing on the
underlying stock price, the delta-normal approach employs a first-order Taylor series
approximation of the change in the option value:
Dc » dDS( A 5 )
where Dc = c – c* and DS = S – S*. S is the underlying stock price, d denotes the option’s
delta, and the asterisks refer to the current values of the variables.  Thus,
c » c* - dS* + dS = k + dS( A 6 )
                                                          
b The first-order approximation appears plausible, for example, if the time horizon is very short, and if
the products themselves have a relatively linear pay-off profile.  In other cases, however, the delta-
normal approach may not be appropriate, and more sophisticated techniques are required, such as delta-
gamma approaches. For details, see Dowd (1998).23
where k = c* - dS* is treated as a constant. The option value-at-risk, VaR




s = -dasS( A 7 )
The delta-normal approach may also be applied to fixed income products.  While the
relationship between bond prices and yields is generally non-linear, an approximation around
the current combination of price (P) and yield (y) is given by:
P(y + Dy) » P(y) + (dP/dy)Dy( A 8 )
Where Dy is some small change in yield.  Given that dP/dy = -D
mP, with Dm denoting the




With the volatility of bond prices given by sR = sP » D
mysy, and assuming that the yield is
normally distributed, the VaR can be approximated by
VaR
bond = asRB » -aD
msyB (A10),
where B is the bond’s present price.
Estimating a central bank’s VaR: The Blejer-Schumacher (1998) approach
According to a representative central bank balance sheet, the monetary authority holds foreign
and domestic assets and has short positions in the monetary base and in domestic and foreign
debt:
Central Bank
               Assets                                 Liabilities          
Gross FX reserves (RCB) Monetary base (H)
FX forwards (F
d) Stock of foreign debt (CCB)
Net domestic credit FX forwards (F
x)
   to banks (DCB)
Net domestic credit to Central bank guarantees to
    the Government (GCB) the financial sector (P)24
Given the unique nature of the central bank, it is important to measure the economic, and not
the historical, values of assets and liabilities.  Thus, all balance sheet items should be
discounted employing the relevant interest rates. The economic value of the central bank
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d = e 
–(id)  is the price of a domestic zero coupon bond denominated in domestic
currency; P
i = e
-(ii) is the price of the international zero coupon bond; and P
f = e 
–(if) is the
price of the country’s foreign currency zero coupon bond.  For simplicity, all assets and
liabilities are assumed to have the same maturity, t = 1. Moreover, i
d, i
i, and i
f are the yields
on the domestic zero coupon, international zero coupon and foreign currency zero coupon
bonds, respectively.  Assuming uncovered interest rate parity and introducing a sovereign
country risk factor, f, we obtain i
d = i
i +E(dS) + f, where E(ds) is the expected change in the
spot exchange rate, S, within period 1.  Furthermore, i
f = i
i + f. Central bank guarantees to the
financial sector, P, may be explicit or implicit and are a function of the domestic interest rate,
the financial system’s liabilities to assets ratio, or leverage ratio (L/A), and the volatility of
the financial institutions’ assets, sA
2.
Employing a number of simplifying assumptions,
c  the central bank’s VaRCB may be






















2 + covariances] 
½ k  (A12),
where k depends on the confidence level. According to A12, the central bank VaR is a
function of the volatilities of the exchange rate, of the bonds’ prices and of the level of the
exposures.
                                                          
c Apart from normality, Blejer and Schumacher assume that (i) the monetary base expands in response
to changes in international reserves and central bank credit to the private sector and the Government
(i.e., dH = dGCB + dRCB + dDCB); (ii) the Government does not repay its debt to the central bank (i.e., g
= 0); (iii) new reserves are invested at par value; (iv) new loans to the banks are granted at par value;





Expanding the Blejer-Schumacher framework
In reality, the treasury is also subject to market risk. Specifically, the treasury may also hold
FX reserves, RG, and may be engaged in direct lending operations vis-à-vis enterprises, E
(i.e., holds a long position).  On the liabilities side, it borrows from the banking system (i.e.,
the central bank, GCB, and deposit money banks, GDMB) as well as from the public by issuing
bonds, GB.  Moreover, the government may hold part of the country’s stock of foreign debt,
CG.  Finally, there may be explicit or implicit state guarantees, SG.  With R = RCB + RG , C =
CCB + CG, D = DCB – GDMB  and consolidating GCB  we get:
Consolidated
Balance Sheet
               Assets                                 Liabilities          
Total FX reserves (R) Monetary base (H)
FX forwards (F
d) Borrowing from the public (B)
Net domestic credit Total stock of foreign debt (C)
to banks (D)
 Credit to enterprises (E) FX forwards (F
x)
Financial sector
   guarantees (P)
State guarantees (SG)
















where state guarantees are assumed to be a function of the foreign interest rate, the foreign
debt to assets ratio of the enterprise sector and the volatility of the sector’s assets.  The VaR
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½ k (A14).26
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